Network Neutrality Disclosures: More and Less Information by Bonner, Elizabeth Austin
I/S: A JOURNAL OFLAWAND POSYFORTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY
Network Neutrality Disclosures: More and Less
Information
ELIZABETH AUSTIN BONNER
In December 2010, the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") adopted a new Network Neutrality
Order that requires broadband providers to publicly disclose
practices that might violate Network Neutrality. This Article
argues that the Commission must carefully design disclosure
rules in order to achieve results that justify the investment of
resources in creating, distributing, and consuming
information about Network Neutrality practices. In Part I, I
provide a brief sketch of the history of disclosure as a
Network Neutrality regulation. Disclosure has been a part of
the policy debate from its inception and figures prominently
in the 2010 Open Internet Order. Though the Order's future
remains uncertain, disclosure regulation in some form is
likely to survive a successful attempt at judicial or
congressional repeal of the FCC action. In Part II, I outline
the potential benefits of mandated disclosure: enhanced
competition in the market for broadband services; increased
democratic participation in Network Neutrality regulation;
improved performance of both regulators and providers; and
practical advantages that make disclosure easier to design
and enact than other regulatory options. Part III assesses the
many ways that mandated disclosure could fail. Finally, I
suggest a targeted system that manages those risks by
directing more information to regulators, broadband
providers, and other repeat players at the FCC while
reducing the informational burden on consumers. Instead of
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more information, I argue that the Commission should focus
on giving consumers better advice.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are implementing optimization and transcoding technologies in
our network to transmit data files in a more efficient manner to
allow available network capacity to benefit the greatest number of
users.
-- Verizon Wireless User Agreement'
The next time you subscribe to broadband service, you'll be
entering into a contract that contains terms like the one above. In
December 2010, the Federal Communications Commission enacted
new Network Neutrality regulations, including a requirement that
broadband providers disclose the techniques they employ to manage
their networks, many of which have direct and indirect effects on the
content users will be able to access. Can a transparency requirement
be fulfilled by terms so opaque?2 This Article looks at the potential
benefits of Network Neutrality disclosure regulations and the myriad
ways they can (and, as Verizon's agreement demonstrates, do) fail.
Those challenges can be overcome by creating a two-tiered disclosure
regime: detailed, extensive disclosures for regulators, companies, and
consumer watchdogs, and simple advisory disclosures that the
Commission can use to provide advice to ordinary consumers.
Itself a reflection of the ongoing struggle over the subject, the term
"Network Neutrality" has no fixed, neutral definition.3 Though they
lack the teeth of enforceable regulations, the four Internet Policy
Principles outlined in the FCC's 2005 Broadband Policy Statement
offer a common touchstone:
I Customer Agreement, VERIZON WIRELESS,
https://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/globalTexttextName=CUSTOMER AGREEMENT
&jspName=footer/customerAgreement.jsp (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
2 For a plain-English explanation of this term in Verizon's agreement, see Kevin C. Tofel,
Verizon Soft Caps Make Sense, But Carry a Harsh Penalty, GIGAOM (Feb. 3, 2011),
available at http://gigaom.com/broadband/verizon-soft-caps-make-sense-but-carry-a-
harsh-penalty.
3 For a routinely updated list of the competing definitions, see Network Neutrality,
WIKIPEDIA.COM, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-neutrality (last visited Feb. 19,
2012).
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To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and
promote the open and interconnected nature of the
public Internet, consumers are entitled to:
* access the lawful Internet content of their
choice;
* run applications and use services of their
choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement;
* connect their choice of legal devices that do not
harm the network; and
* competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content
providers.4
These principles, when enforced, protect consumers from a multitude
of sins, including existing and anticipated measures that allow
providers of Internet access services to discriminate against lawful
content, applications, and devices by blocking, delaying, or charging
more to transport certain types of information.5 Network Neutrality
advocates argue that "guaranteeing a neutral network eliminates the
risk of future discrimination, providing greater incentives to invest in
broadband application development today" and "facilitates fair
competition among applications, ensuring the survival of the fittest,
rather than that favored by network bias." 6 In addition to allaying
concerns about social control and freedom of expression, Network
Neutrality promotes innovation by ensuring "predictability of the
network and a certain security of investment."7
4 In The Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over
Wireline Facilities, 2o F.C.C.R. 14986, 14987 (2005) (policy statement) [hereinafter
Internet Policy Statement].
5 See id.
6 Ex Parte Notice of Tim Wu and Lawrence Lessig, The Appropriate Regulatory Treatment
for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, filed CS Docket No. 02-52
(Aug. 22, 2003) at 3, available at http://timwu.org/wu lessigfcc.pdf.
7 Id.
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At the same time, powerful forces have aligned against any
attempt to enforce the Principles. For many commentators, Network
Neutrality regulations represent a solution in search of a problem.
Reports of interruptions in Internet service were and are "isolated."8
For broadband network operators, the kinds of conduct decried by
Network Neutrality advocates as interference with the free flow of
information are desirable-and perhaps necessary-to maintain high-
quality service by managing the flood of increasing traffic.9 Internet
access service providers also defend their traffic management
techniques as protecting fairness; why should the entire network of
customers suffer slower speeds in the name of protecting power users'
on-demand access to bandwidth-intense but often frivolous content?1o
The best-documented violation of the Internet Policy Principles,
later the subject of litigation between the FCC and Comcast,"1 was
discovered by a Comcast subscriber in February 2007.12 Robb
Topolski, an engineer at Intel and a fan of (public domain) Civil War-
era barbershop music, noticed that his attempts to share his collection
online attracted no takers. Topolski's tests, later recreated by the
Associated Press, demonstrated that Comcast was blocking file-
sharing programs such as BitTorrent, preventing its customers from
using the service to share and receive the lawful content of their
choice.13 Other invasive techniques allow broadband providers
transporting information across the Internet to "read" the contents of
those messages and handle them differently based on that
8 Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J.
1847, 1857 (2006).
9 Id. at 1874.
10 See Customer Agreement, supra note 1.
11 Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 6oo F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
12 Daniel Roth, The Dark Lord ofBroadband Tries to Fix Comcast's Image, WIRED, Feb.
2009, at 55-56.
13 Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 7, 2007,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/ns/technology-and-science-
internet.
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information.14 These tools could be used by private entities to amass
unprecedented control over speech and knowledge.15
After years of failed legislation (some prescribing command-and-
control techniques and some barring the FCC from regulating)16 and a
ruling that the Commission lacks the legal authority to enforce the
Internet Policy Principles,17 the FCC has adopted a new Open Internet
Order. The Order creates regulations based on the Principles,
including rules that mandate disclosure of "network management
practices, performance characteristics, and terms and conditions of
their broadband services" and some command-and-control provisions
that prohibit unreasonable discrimination and blocking of "lawful
content, applications, services or non-harmful devices." 8 A number of
Internet access service providers already obey similar rules created as
part of consent decrees required for merger approval,19 the
requirements to participate in the 700 MHz wireless spectrum
auction,20 and the requirements for grantees under the broadband
programs of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.21 The
Order's transparency provisions became effective in late 2011 after the
14 Just Deliver the Packets, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA,
http://dpi.priv.ge.ca/index.php/essays/just-deliver-the-packets (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
15 See generally TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH 299 (2010).
16 For an idea of the variety of bills introduced in the first Congress to take up Net
Neutrality, see Anne Broche, Net Neutrality Field in Congress Gets Crowded, CNET NEWS
(May 19, 2006, 2:47pm), http://news.cnet.com/Net-neutrality-field-in-Congress-gets-
crowded/2100-1028_3-6074564.html.
17 For a summary of the history leading up to the Open Internet Order, see Stacey
Higginbotham, A Net Neutrality TYmeline: How We Got Here, GIGAOM (Dec. 21, 2010),
http://gigaom.com/2010/12/21/a-net-neutrality-timeline-how-we-got-here.
18 In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, 25 F.C.C.R.
17905, 17906 (2010) (report and order) [hereinafter Open Internet Order]. These rules
apply somewhat differently to wireline and wireless providers of Internet access services.
The transparency requirement that is the focus of this Article applies equally to both types
of providers.
19 In the Matter of Applications of Comcast Corp., Gen. Elec. Co. & NBC Universal, Inc., 26
F.C.C.R 4238, 4249 (2011).
20 In the Matter of Service Rules for the 698-46, 747-62 and 777-92 MHz Bands, 22
F.C.C.R. 15289 (2007).
21 Notice of Funds Availability (NOFA) and Solicitation of Applications, 74 Fed. Reg. 33104
(July 9, 2009).
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Federal Register announced that the Office of Management and
Budget had approved the information collection mandates.22
This Article argues that the Commission must carefully design
disclosure rules in order to achieve results that justify the investment
of resources in creating, distributing, and consuming information
about Network Neutrality practices.23 Part I provides a brief sketch of
the history of disclosure as a Network Neutrality regulation.
Disclosure has been a part of the policy debate from its inception, and
figures prominently in the 2010 Open Internet Order. Though the
Order's future remains uncertain, disclosure regulation in some form
is likely to survive a successful attempt at judicial or congressional
repeal of the FCC action. Part II outlines the potential benefits of
mandated disclosure: enhanced competition in the market for
broadband services, increased democratic participation in Network
Neutrality regulation, improved performance of both regulators and
providers, and practical advantages that make disclosure easier to
design and enact than other regulatory options. Part III assesses the
many ways that mandated disclosure could fail. Finally, this Article
suggests a two-tiered system that manages those risks by directing
more information to regulators, broadband providers, and other
repeat players at the FCC while reducing the informational burden on
consumers. Instead of more information, the Commission should
focus on giving consumers better advice.
II. DISCLOSURE AS A NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION
Among many divergent proposals for Network Neutrality
regulation that agree on little else, mandated disclosure is a common
theme.24 Early in the debate, disclosure was advanced as a "third way"
22 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 161.
23 In order to focus directly on the efficacy of disclosure as a method of regulating practices
that violate Network Neutrality principles, this Article will leave unaddressed a number of
interesting questions at the heart of the Network Neutrality debate. This paper assumes a
normative conclusion, embodied in the FCC's current order, that a neutral network is
worth pursuing. I also set aside the extensively debated question of whether the Federal
Communications Commission has the authority to enact Network Neutrality regulations
that affect providers of Internet access services.
24 Compare Comments of Verizon, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, filed GN
Docket No. og-191 (Jan. 14, 2010), at 51, available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=702o378523, with Comments of Public
Internet Commenters, In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet, filed GN Docket No.
o9-191 (Jan. 14, 2010), at 63, available at
http://ffallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7020378818.
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alternative between competing proposals that the FCC either (a)
institute command-and-control regulations, including bans on
broadband provider efforts to charge for priority transmission of some
types of information or otherwise use their control of the "pipes" to
shape customer's access to content or (b) do nothing.25 Today, the
transparency prong of the Commission's Open Internet Order
embodies similar ideas, enacted alongside other forms of regulation.
As opposing parties seek judicial and legislative relief from the new
rules, the Order's mandated disclosure requirements may, in the end,
survive while other Network Neutrality regulations are repealed or
overturned.
1. Early "third way" proposals. Following the early legislative
debates about Network Neutrality, Rob Atkinson, a D.C. policy
analyst, and Professor Phil Weiser responded to an "unfortunate turn
on Capitol Hill" toward strident partisan rhetoric and hardening
polarization with a "third way" proposal.26 Their program sought to
avoid the extremes of Republican efforts to strip the FCC of
jurisdiction needed to enact Network Neutrality regulations and
Democratic efforts to limit the ability of broadband providers to offer
and charge for higher levels of quality of service. Instead, Atkinson
and Weiser advocated "antitrust like" action by the FCC against
abuses of market power, tax incentives for broadband investment
including a "best efforts" pipe to consumers (today's status quo), and
mandated disclosure of "the level of bandwidth, amount of latency
(delay), and any limitations on the ability of consumers to access the
content or services of their choice."27 The FCC would then monitor
compliance with the stated terms and require that, in order to call a
service "broadband," providers of Internet access services provide at
least a basic level of unmanaged access.28 In addition to taking
advantage of some emerging points of political consensus, this
proposal-unlike outright bans on non-neutral conduct-allowed for
the flexibility needed to adapt to rapidly changing technologies. Later,
Weiser and other commentators would argue for shifting the focus of
25 See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007).
2 6 ROBERT D. ATKINSON & PHILIP J. WEISER, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND
INNOVATION FOUNDATION, A "THIRD WAY" ON NETWORK NEUTRALITY 1-2 (2006),
http://www.itif.org/files/netneutrality.pdf.
27 Id. at 2.
28 Id. at 11.
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the Network Neutrality debate to the Federal Trade Commission,
which could monitor the truthfulness of mandated disclosures about
network management as part of its broader consumer protection
responsibilities.29
2. The current Order. The FCC'S 2010 Order adopts a disclosure
mandate as part of a three-part strategy for securing a "neutral
communications medium" as "the basis of a fair, competitive market
economy, of democracy, and of science."3o Unlike the earlier "third
way" proposals that relied on incentives and enforcement of broad
competitive principles, the Commission's Order includes direct,
broadband industry-specific prohibitions on unreasonable
discrimination and on blocking lawful content, applications, services
or non-harmful devices.31 The Order envisions a single disclosure,
published on each provider's website, that provides information about
network practices (congestion management, application-specific
behavior, and device attachment rules), performance characteristics
(service descriptions and the impact of specialized services), and
commercial terms (pricing, privacy policies, and redress options).32
Notably, the transparency requirement, unlike the other regulatory
tools adopted in the Order, applies equally to wired and wireless
broadband providers.33
3. The only thing that remains after judicial or congressional
repeal? Though it represents a compromise born out of years of
debate and negotiations, the Open Internet Order is really only the
end of the beginning of the rulemaking process. The Order's
opponents have announced their intention to seek repeal, either in
Congress or the courts. At the beginning of the 112th Congress, shortly
29 See generally Phillip J. Weiser, The Next Frontier in Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L.
REV. 273, 291-98 (20o8), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1o80672.
30 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, at 18039 (statement of Chairman Julius
Genachowski).
31 Id. at 17906.
32 Id. at 17938-39.
33 Id. at 17906. An increasing number of Americans, including a large segment of low-
income and minority Internet users, rely exclusively on mobile broadband, typically
accessed by mobile phones rather than computers. See generally The Spectrum Initiative:
Mobile Broadband Spectrum and its Impacts for U.S. Consumers and the Economy, An
Engineering Analysis, MOBILEFUTURE.ORG (Mar. 16, 2011),
http://www.mobilefuture.org/page/-/rysavy-spectrum-effects-3o161 1.pdf.
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after the Order was adopted, the incoming House Majority Leader and
Whip promised congressional action to roll back the Network
Neutrality rules and establish new limits on the FCC's authority.34 In
March, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce passed "a
resolution disapproving the rule submitted by the Federal
Communications Commission with respect to regulating the Internet
and broadband industry practices,"35 beginning a little-used process
that would allow Congress to reverse the Commission's action.36
Verizon and MetroPCS have also launched lawsuits in an effort to
vacate the Open Internet rules, attacking first the jurisdictional basis
for the FCC's ability to enact the rules.37 Many more such suits are
expected to be filed, and it could be years before the courts reach the
substantive review of the rules themselves. As Congress and the courts
consider these challenges, disclosure as a Network Neutrality
regulation will remain an important area for consideration. Even if a
court finds that the Commission does not have the authority to ban
non-neutral practices like paid prioritization,38 the Order's
transparency requirements could be enacted either under authority
ancillary to the Commission's other data collection mandates or under
34 Tony Romm, GOP lawmakers threaten to repeal Net neutrality, POLrIcO (Dec. 21,
2010), www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46685.html.
35 H.R.J. Res. 37, 112th Cong. (2011), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c112:H.J.Res.37.
36 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R4o163, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AND POSSIBLE
CONSOLIDATION INTO A SINGLE MEASURE OF RESOLUTIONS DISAPPROVING REGULATIONS
(2009) ("The Congressional Review Act (CRA) establishes expedited procedures for
Congress to disapprove regulations issued by Federal agencies. Disapproval under these
procedures requires enactment of a joint resolution that has a specified text and is
submitted within 60 days (excluding recesses) after Congress receives the regulation. For
these disapproval resolutions, the act provides expedited procedures for Senate
consideration and to clear the measure for Presidential action. If the resolution becomes
law, the rule not only becomes of no force and effect, but is treated as if it had never taken
effect, and the issuing agency may issue no substantially similar rule without subsequent
authorization by law.").
37 See Editorial, Net Neutrality, Back in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2011, at A20.
38 See Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 1 115-38 (discussing the Commission's legal
authority to enact the Open Internet Order).
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the current authority of the Federal Trade Commission,39 Surviving
even a dramatic rollback of the FCC's Order or statutory authority.
III. WHY DISCLOSURE?
For a broad spectrum of regulatory problems-both the
substantive challenges that regulations respond to and the political
problems inherent in enacting regulations-disclosure is seen by an
influential group of scholars and regulators as a near-panacea.
Assessing the growing ideological and practical backlash against the
burgeoning administrative state, Cass Sunstein, who has written
extensively about disclosure in both his academic and governmental
work, posits that "perhaps the first goal [of regulation] ought to be to
ensure genuinely informed choices, rather than to dictate outcomes
from Washington."40 Disclosure's initial attractiveness as a regulatory
tool is demonstrated by its implementation in areas as different as
securities and dietary supplement safety. In this Part, this Article
outlines the benefits of mandated disclosure frequently cited by
transparency advocates: enhanced competition in the market for
broadband services; increased citizen participation in Network
Neutrality regulation; improved performance of both regulators and
providers; and practical advantages that make disclosure easier to
enact than other regulatory options.
A. COMPETITION
With increased information about Network Neutrality practices,
consumers can make better choices among increasingly differentiated
service providers. Regulators routinely cite increased competition as
the rationale for disclosure regulations. Accurate pricing and
economic efficiency that put resources to their most highly valued
uses require that consumers understand what they are buying. Where
sellers possess information that buyers do not, mandated disclosure
can put consumers on a more level playing field, where they can make
39 Catherine J. Sandoval, Disclosure, Deception, and Deep-Packet Inspection: The Role of
the Federal Trade Commission Act's Deceptive Conduct Prohibitions in the Network
Neutrality Debate, 78 FoRDHAM L. REv. 641, 650 (2009).
40 Cass Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA.
ST. U. L. REv. 653, 654 (1993).
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more efficient choices about how to spend their money.41 Increased
consumer knowledge about a product's features also creates
opportunities to market products that are more differentiated across a
greater number of non-price factors, better satisfying consumer
preferences.
For example, Congress explicitly cited competition as the rationale
for the Truth-in-Lending Act of 1968, which created a framework for
providing consumers with standardized, timely information about the
costs of borrowing money.42 The Act includes the Congress's finding
that "informed use of credit" by consumers promotes "competition
among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in
the extension of consumer credit."43 Similarly, the Order describes the
standard for disclosure as information "sufficient for consumers to
make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content,
application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and
maintain the Internet."44
In the Internet access services market, information is distributed
asymmetrically. While most users surveyed by the FCC found
information about the price of their broadband service to be clearly
conveyed in their bills, few consumers thought the information about
speed, restrictions on service, or fees for terminating service were very
clearly presented.45 Providers do not make this information easy to
find or understand, probably because they are not attempting to
compete on these aspects of their service. Advertisements for
broadband focus overwhelmingly on speed and price.46
41 See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1716 (1999) (discussing this dynamic in the health
care market).
42 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-15, 1631-49, 1661-67f (2000 & Supp. II 2004) (implemented by the
Federal Reserve Board via Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2005)).
43 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
44 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 154.
45 FEDERAL COMMC'N COMM'N, BROADBAND SATISFACTION: WHAT CONSUMERS REPORT
ABOUT THEIR BROADBAND INTERNET PROVIDER 6 (2010) (FCC WORKING PAPER), available
at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily Releases/DailyBusiness/201o/dbl206/DOC-303263A1.pdf
[hereinafter BROADBAND SATISFACTION REPORT].
46 Comments of Free Press, In the Matter ofFramework for Broadband Internet Service,
filed GN Docket No. 10-127, 111-13 (July 15, 2010), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=702o543742.
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In announcing the new Open Internet Order, Chairman
Genachowski expressed optimism that the transparency rule could
help cure this information imbalance, arguing that
consumers and innovators have a right to know the
basic performance characteristics of their Internet
access and how their network is being managed. The
transparency rule we adopt today will give consumers
and innovators the clear and simple information they
need to make informed choices in choosing networks or
designing the next killer app.47
Given the widely variable patterns of Internet use among broadband
customers, it makes sense that consumers will have heterogeneous
preferences among different kinds of network management. In
addition to helping consumers best match their preferences to a
product, disclosures can facilitate consumer education that, in turn,
makes it worthwhile to create and market different kinds of
broadband services.
B. PERFORMANCE
Network Neutrality disclosures have the potential to improve
performance measures of knowledge, coordination, and productivity.
Disclosure requirements designed with performance in mind seek to
remedy not the information asymmetries between producers and
consumers that are the focus of the competition rationale, but instead
look to the sharing and coordination of knowledge across the industry,
including among competitors, to improve productivity.48 Individual
information producers take on the cost of generating data, but the
gains from that effort cannot be fully captured by those producers.49
Information is, therefore, generally under-produced, even in well-
functioning markets. Mandatory disclosure rules ensure that all
market participants will generate and distribute information, reducing
search and monitoring costs.50
47 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, at 18039-41.
48 See Sage, supra note 41, at 18oo.
49 See Sage, supra note 41, at 1771.
50 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 722 (1984) ("A mandatory disclosure system can thus be seen
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BONNER
For regulators, the disclosure requirement reduces the cost of
monitoring industry action in an environment of changing
technological strategies. Disclosure laws address the structural
inability of many regulators (the FCC included) to gather and process
information at the speed required to keep up with the industry being
regulated,51 both directly through the information included in the
disclosures and indirectly through interest groups, who employ
technological and other means to analyze the disclosures and make
recommendation to the FCC.s2 Improved knowledge at the
Commission makes possible the kinds of "experimentalist" regulations
that are particularly well-suited to regulatory challenges where
uncertainty remains as to both the problem and potential solutions.53
Mandated disclosure also has the potential to improve the
performance of broadband providers. An upcoming disclosure is an
effective and low-cost way to induce good management. 54 Disclosure
could reveal, for example, that broadband providers are over-
managing their networks, employing more invasive techniques than
their usage statistics suggest are necessary. As illustrated by Comcast's
blocking of BitTorrent, companies that manage their networks secretly
may choose blunt instruments to do so, instead of working to develop
more sophisticated tools.55 Knowing that the information will become
public can motivate broadband providers to develop and deploy
network management techniques that are the alternatives least
restrictive of user choices. For example, after its blocking program was
discovered, Comcast developed a more selective traffic management
technique that responds to specific causes of congestion. Dispersing
as a desirable cost reduction strategy through which society, in effect, subsidizes search
costs to secure both a greater quantity of information and a better testing of its accuracy.").
51 See generally F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
52 See, e.g., MANY EYES (May 30, 2011), http://www-
958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes (IBM's free data analysis and visualization
tools).
53 See generally Charles Sabel & William Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, oo GEO. L.J. 53 (2011).
54 Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency and Corporate Governance: You Manage
What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1996).
55 For a more detailed discussion of the technology Comcast employed to block Bit Torrent,
see Edward B. Mulligan, Derailed By the D.C. Circuit: Getting Network Management
Regulations Back on Track, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 633, 639-42 (2010).
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Network Neutrality information among broadband providers may also
lead to better overall management of the broadband network because
many providers share infrastructure resources, such as the backbone,
which are affected by individual providers' management decisions.
C. DEMOCRACY
Vibrant democracies require information. John Stuart Mill
believed that democracy required public intellect, which requires
widespread knowledge of the facts at hand.56 Civic Republicans see
information as vital to reflective deliberation, a process required to
produce favorable outcomes.57 Skeptics who see the burgeoning
administrative state as prone to abuse and failure believe information
"helps the public monitor the apparatus of government."58
In the case of Network Neutrality, although providers will disclose
non-governmental conduct, the democratic rationale for disclosure
remains important because the private behavior of broadband
providers has such significant public implications.59 The central
question of the Network Neutrality debate is to what extent the
owners of those pathways should be able to control, directly or
indirectly, the content of the speech that flows over them. Broadband
providers control the means by which the vast majority of our
communications reach others, thereby implicating speech and
deliberation on every topic of public concern.60
The democratic participation made possible by mandatory
Network Neutrality disclosures facilitates popular consent, allows
consumers to monitor the FCC's work, and facilitates the public
deliberation needed to overcome the collective action problem
inherent in regulating this shared resource. First, mandated disclosure
facilitates the public knowledge needed to legitimize the Commission's
decision to allow broadband providers to ration service. Broadband
providers argue that some non-neutral network management
56 See Sage, supra note 41, at 1803.
57 see CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 17-35 (1970).
58 See Sage, supra note 41, at 1803.
59 WU, supra note 15, at 300 ("We like to believe that our safeguards against concentrated
political power will ultimately protect us from the consequences of accumulated economic
power. But this hasn't always been so.").
60 WU, supra note 15, at 303-o8.
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techniques are required because "data hogs" can overwhelm scarce
bandwidth resources.6' The Open Internet Order allows rationing to
allocate bandwidth in two ways: the Order allows companies to create
"quality of service" tiers where providers of specific functions, such as
bandwidth intensive transfers of medical results between hospitals,
pay more for preferential delivery. The need for popular consent to
rationing is even clearer in the case of wireless broadband service,
which relies on the finite and publicly held resource of wireless
spectrum. 62 The Order allows wireless broadband providers much
greater latitude to use non-blocking network management techniques.
Second, the Order's transparency requirement will facilitate
popular participation in a process that is still working toward
consensus rules. 63 As noted in Part I, the Order is only the end of the
beginning of the Commission's work toward creating a complete
framework for Network Neutrality regulation. Even if the rules
withstand efforts at congressional or judicial repeal, the important
work of adjudicating whether specific practices violate the new rules
has not yet begun. Evaluating new technological advances in network
management will be an ongoing responsibility of the FCC. Mandated
disclosure prepares the public to contribute to this continuing debate.
Finally, disclosure makes possible the public deliberation needed
to overcome the collective action problem inherent in the regulatory
structure the Order creates. The individual purchasing decisions at the
heart of the competition rationale64 may exclude from their scope the
most important economic and social consequences of Network
Neutrality regulation. Imagine that you are shopping for a new cell
61 Yoo, supra note 8.
62 Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("Because of the scarcity of
radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of
others whose views should be expressed on this unique medium."). Note that the scarcity
argument is much less compelling on the wired side, where congestion is a function of use
and investment by broadband providers, which has not been sufficient.
63 See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocratic Experimentalism,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 267, 444 (1998) ("By setting and continuously improving the standards
for directly deliberative participation by which all instrumentalities of government are
judged, as a condition of their own activities, the agencies safeguard democracy while
advancing it.").
64 See Lauren E. Willis, Decision-making and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 743 (2oo6) ("The informational fix assumes
that consumers will make self-interested, well-informed, rational probabilistic financial
choices using the disclosures.").
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phone data plan. You do not watch much video on your phone, but
when you do, you use your Netflix subscription. It would make sense,
then, to purchase a plan from a wireless provider that provides
priority to Netflix, allowing you to stream videos at a higher quality
from Netflix than from other services. That decision may be optimal
for your current needs, but an entire nation of subscribers making the
same calculus could induce providers to consistently favor established
content companies. New competitors in the streaming video market
would be relegated to slower service, making it harder to compete
with Netflix and easier for Netflix to raise its prices. Mandated
disclosure ensures that broadband companies are providing
information about their network management practices to the public
at large, and not just for potential or current consumers, so that
societal deliberation about the larger consequences of the purchase
decision can take place.
D. PRACTICALITIES
Of all the rationales for mandated disclosure, Realpolitik is
perhaps the most persuasive. Simply put, disclosure is easy to
accomplish because it shifts costs away from regulators, requires less
precise tailoring than other regulatory measures, and squares with
widely held values.
In a time of limited and overextended resources, mandated
disclosure typically shifts regulatory costs away from government to
the regulated industry.65 Companies pay for data design, collection,
dissemination, and maintenance. 66 Once informed, consumers and
interest groups share the costs of monitoring whether the company's
actual behavior complies with their disclosed policies.
Compared to other regulatory tools, it is also easy to build a
coalition around disclosure. Groups left, right, and center
recommended disclosure to the FCC in its most recent Network
Neutrality docket.67 That consensus may be the result of the broad
range of rationales discussed in this Part and their relationships to
varying ideological and political commitments. Less charitably,
65 See Sage, supra note 41, at 1772.
66 James E. Dunstan, Lieberman's Cyberspace Protection Bill: Enhancing Cybersecurity,
or Establishing a New Uber-Authority?, n.3 (June 2010), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/ps/20lo/ps6.11-cyberspace protection bill.html.
67 See Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 1 56.
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agreement on disclosure may be the result of disclosure's amorphous
nature. In this Rorschach test, mandated transparency looks like
action to constituents who want action and looks minimally invasive
to groups that don't want regulation.
Furthermore, disclosure requirements require less precision to
design than other types of regulations. In contrast, Network Neutrality
regulations must be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changing
technologies through which broadband providers might manage their
networks.6 8 They must also accommodate changing consumer
preferences and beliefs about what is reasonable. At present, the de
facto neutrality spurred by the FCC's BitTorrent decision and the
regulatory uncertainty that followed means that few users have
experienced non-neutral practices by the providers. Even if they had,
few would know what had occurred. Robb Topolski, as you will recall
from Part I, was an electrical engineer with lots of free time on his
hands when he discovered Comcast's blocking actions. Given that
many network management policies mimic other connection
problems, such as slowed speeds, most consumers will not recognize
when these tactics affect their online experience. Disclosure regulation
may be uniquely suited to this moment when many consumers,
through the increased awareness created by disclosure and new
consumer tools, 69 will be aware of their provider's network
management practices for the first time.7o
Finally, regulation by disclosure fits squarely into an American
value system that places priority on individual choice and
responsibility. In addition to being a precondition for economic
efficiency, Sunstein notes that informational remedies have their roots
deeply embedded in our system of government:
68 For example, at the time of the proceedings on Comcast's blocking of BitTorrent,
Comcast had not yet developed its protocol-agnostic traffic management system. John
Timmer, Comcast Testing Protocol-Agnostic Traffic Management, ARS TECHNICA (June 3,
2008), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2oo8/o6/comcast-testing-protocol-agnostic-
traffic-management.ars.
69 FCC Open Internet Apps Challenge, CHALLENGE.GOV, http://challenge.gov/FCC/114-fec-
open-internet-apps-challenge (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
70 See Sage, supra note 41, at 1724 n.6o ("[H]eterogeniety of preferences reinforces the
importance of allowing consumer choice, and therefore makes disclosure laws preferable to
substantive regulation that limits the range of available options."). The current FCC Order
only adopts part of this rationale, as it provides information but also eliminates certain
choices, such as carriers that block specific legal applications.
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The most general way to put the point is to note that in
the framers' view, America was supposed to be a
deliberative democracy in which representatives,
accountable to the people, would make decisions
through a process of deliberation uncontrolled by
private factions. Without better information, neither
deliberation nor democracy is possible. Legal reforms
designed to remedy the situation are a precondition for
democratic politics.7'
In the search for political common ground on an issue that does not
split neatly along party lines, increased information production
satisfies both sides. For both supporters and opponents of further,
more intensive regulation, disclosure legitimizes the decision (to do
nothing or to do a lot more) by creating an informed public
discernment process.72
IV. How NETWORK NEUTRALITY DISCLOSURE COULD FAIL
Despite these benefits, many commentators are skeptical of
disclosure. Successful regulation through mandated disclosure
requires that policymakers, disclosers, and disclosees "play [their]
demanding parts properly."73 This need for analysis, coordination, and
compliance by numerous participants creates many opportunities for
disclosure to fail, both immediately and long after the policy's initial
implementation, and for disclosure regulation to consume more
resources than its benefits can justify. This Part addresses in turn each
of the actors in the Open Internet Order's transparency regime-
regulators at the FCC, broadband providers, and consumers-and the
problems inherent in their participation.
A. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
Having determined that regulation is necessary and that
mandated disclosure is an appropriate regulatory response to the
71 See Sunstein, supra note 40, at 658.
72 See Pateman, supra note 57.
73 Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure ofMandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. 647, 679 (2011).
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problem,74 the FCC must now decide (and perhaps decide again in the
future, depending on the Order's fate) on the proper scope of
disclosure and against what standards each disclosure's adequacy will
be measured. The Order is vague on each of these points, and the
Commission's decisions on scope and standards will likely be
developed as a product of its initial enforcement.
Improperly aligned incentives, lack of expertise, and normative
uncertainty can cause initially modest disclosures to balloon to cover
vast swaths of information. The relatively light governmental burden
that makes disclosure so attractive to policymakers75 creates a kind of
moral hazard. In this case, an incremental expansion to the scope of
disclosure adds little to the Commission's costs, while increasing the
burden on Internet access providers (who pay to produce and
distribute the information) and consumers (who must sort, prioritize,
and analyze the information). Even when regulators are mindful of
disclosure's cost, they may lack the expertise to properly define the
optimal scope and err on the side of excess information.
Given the broad range of network management activities that
Network Neutrality regulation seeks to cover and the relative newness
of those techniques and technologies, it's possible that no one knows
what information disclosees need.76 Under this kind of uncertainty,
Ben-Sharar and Schneider explain, disclosure mandates multiply in
an attempt to cover all available bases.77 Finally, normative
uncertainty may compound the expansive effect of factual uncertainty.
Deep political divisions between the Commissioners have led to a
compromise Order full of equivocation on the value of a neutral
network. Differing views on the principles undergirding the Open
Internet proceeding and an under-theorized view of the ideal conduct
by carriers that should result from the Order may lead to an over-
74 For the reasons described in Part II, I believe that disclosure has secured its place in
whatever regulatory scheme for Network Neutrality is implemented. Were regulation
beginning with a completely blank slate, whether disclosure should be included could be a
highly contestable point. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 679-81, for a
discussion of potential errors by lawmakers in the early stages of disclosure regulation.
7s See supra Part III.D.
76 Many disclosures that seem intuitively beneficial turn out to have little, if any, effect. See,
e.g., Calorie Labeling Has No Effect on Teenagers' or Parents' Food Purchases, NYU
LANGONE MEDICAL CENTER (Feb. 15, 2011), available at
http://communications.med.nyu.edu/media-relations/news/calorie-labeling-has-no-
effect-teenagers%E2%8o%99-or-parents%E2%8o%99-food-purchases.
77 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 688-89.
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inclusive whole, comprising many different views on what types of
information are needed.
Standards against which regulatory disclosures are evaluated vary
dramatically. At one end of the spectrum, food-labeling mandates
require a high degree of formal compliance, both in form and content.
On the other hand, "informed consent" discussions between doctors
and patients are held to such loose standards that practices vary
dramatically across institutions. Likely because of the factual and
normative uncertainty discussed above, the current Order leaves
decisions about the form and content of disclosures required by the
transparency provisions largely in the hands of the companies
providing the information.78
Finally, disclosure requirements may ultimately harm the overall
regulatory project by supplanting more effective regulatory schemes.
As this section explains, disclosure benefits are highly contingent and
dependent on the coordination of a large and diverse group of actors.
While transparency may advance the competition, performance, and
democracy goals outlined in Part II, it is hardly sufficient for any of
them. Given the political and policy appeal of this kind of regulation,
governmental actors may overlook or ignore other requirements for
achieving those aims when disclosure is seen, without adequate
justification, as having done the job. The risk of such incomplete
action is compounded by the fact that regulated providers of
broadband services may acquiesce to a relatively modest disclosure
burden in an attempt to avoid more invasive regulation.
B. INTERNET ACCESS PROVIDERS
The lack of detail in the Order makes many interpretations
possible. Even well-meaning providers of Internet access services may
make errors in interpreting the mandate, collecting information, and
distributing the disclosures that threaten the effectiveness of the
Order's transparency program.
With a vague standard and a history of lax enforcement by the
Commission,79 regulated companies are likely to interpret the
transparency mandate in ways that favor themselves, at least initially.
For some companies, that may mean minimizing compliance costs by
78 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 156.
79 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-79, FCC MANAGEMENT: IMPROVEMENTS
NEEDED IN COMMUNICATION, DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, AND WORKFORCE PLANNING
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dlo79.pdf.
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staying as close as possible to the information they already provide. In
this way, companies could easily, if only temporarily, thwart the
purpose of the mandate. Many of the current disclosures, such as
Comcast's interminable end user agreement,so vacillate between vague
and incomprehensibly complex contract terms. Had these disclosures
been sufficient, there might have been no need for the Commission to
act. For other companies, the self-serving strategy may be to wait and
see. Uncertainty about what qualifies as "reasonable" will lead some
companies to initially offer insufficient disclosures and wait for
litigation to force them to provide more and better information.
Political divisions around Network Neutrality make this delay tactic
even more likely, because stalling now might allow companies to wait
for a more favorable environment after judicial or legislative repeal or
significant changes to the regulatory scheme.
Data collection may turn out to be more costly and difficult than
initially predicted. Independent telephone and telecommunications
providers already complain about the relatively modest burden of
"Form 477" data reporting requirements, which are used to determine
the deployment of broadband and telecommunications services, the
preparation of which consumes (by one estimate) roughly forty two
business days per submission.8' In establishing the 477 rule, the
Commission estimated those disclosures would take twenty hours.82
Industry associations have already filed complaints that the estimates
of how long Network Neutrality disclosures will take to complete are
too low.
Under the current Order, providers decide how and when to
distribute the disclosed information. Consumers' purchasing patterns
make it difficult for companies to provide this information in a way
that has a reasonable chance of impacting the decision to subscribe.
Consumers rarely switch providers. 83 Even if companies wanted to
80 ComcastAcceptable Use Policy for High-Speed Internet, COMCAST,
http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Customers/Policies/HighSpeedInternetAUP.html
(last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
81 Letter from Independent Telephone and Telecommunications Alliance Regarding Local
Telephone Competition and Broadband Reporting, 73 Fed. Reg. 73931 (Jan. 22, 2009),
available at http://www.itta.us/advocacy/2009/4772.pdf.
82 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OIRA CONCLUSION, ICR
Ref. No. 199802-3060-013 (1998), available at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref nbr=199802-3o6o-o13-
83 Broadband Satisfaction Report, supra note 45.
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provide this information at the point of sale, as many commenters
suggested the FCC require, 84 it would be difficult to do so in a way that
covers all the information the Commission suggests they provide.
Imagine the already interminable phone conversation it takes to get
U-Verse (AT&T's fiber-optic broadband network) working at your
house now extending to cover AT&T's congestion management,
application-specific behavior, device attachment, and security
policies-to name less than half of the things about which you would
be required to hear.85 Research shows that the lucky consumers who
subscribe via providers' websites will mercifully spare themselves that
drudgery by simply clicking through the agreement without reading.86
If broadband providers do the minimum the FCC suggests in the
Order ("prominently display or provide links to disclosure on a
publicly available, easily accessible website that is available to current
and prospective end users and edge users as well as to the
Commission"87), they'll likely ensure that only people who really,
really want to find the information will ever see it-which might be
what they are going for.
C. CONSUMERS
Even if government and industry actors do everything right, the
success of regulation by mandated disclosure remains imperiled in the
hands of its intended beneficiaries: consumers, the party that is not
(and should not be) required by Network Neutrality disclosure laws to
do anything. For transparency requirements to be effective,
consumers must successfully acquire the information, understand it
well enough to use it to make a decision, and continue making
decisions in a climate of information overload. Behavioral studies
show that lay people often fail at each of these steps.
Before they ever begin searching for information, consumers must
first realize that they need it. Current studies offer an unclear picture
of what consumers know about network management and their
84 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, at 17939 n.184.
85 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 714 (arguing that oral disclosures are
even less understandable than printed versions).
86 See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form
Contracts (Law & Economics Research Papers Series, Working Paper No. 09-40, 2009).
87 Open Internet Order, supra note 18, 11 57.
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broadband service; the FCC's surveys, like those conducted about
engagement with the Network Neutrality debate, ask respondents to
assess their own knowledge-but the questioners don't check to see if
the respondent was correct.88 Perhaps the best indication of what
consumers currently consider when choosing a broadband provider is
the kinds of information broadband companies have decided is
worthwhile to advertise. Those solicitations pertain almost exclusively
to speed and price, suggesting that consumers currently perceive
Internet access services as a commodity with little variation in quality
across providers. 89 Even consumers who realize they should consider
their provider's stance on Network Neutrality still have to find that
information, the flip side of the distribution question discussed in Part
III.B. As explained there, the current Order gives broadband providers
little incentive to draw customers' attention to the disclosures.
For customers who do eventually acquire the needed information,
the hard work is only just beginning.90 Beyond the usual
comprehension challenges of widespread illiteracy91 and
innumeracy,92 understanding and analyzing the implications of
Network Neutrality disclosures requires specialized knowledge. Ask
yourself: do you know the difference between a bit and byte? If you do,
what does your experience tell you to expect about your provider's
advertised speed of 12 megabits per second? If you (correctly) expect
to get in reality about half the speed that was promised, how long does
that mean it will take you to download Avatar from iTunes? What if
you want the Blu-ray edition?
Knowing what the disclosure means, you will still have to decide
what it means to you. Studies have shown that we tend to be overly
88 Broadband Satisfaction Report, supra note 45, at 5.
89 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 709-10.
go See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 27-28 (1982) (arguing that one
cause of market failure is the inability of buyers, even in the presence of competition, "to
evaluate the characteristics of the products or services" on offer); Susan Rose-Ackerman,
Progressive Law and Economics and the New Administrative Law, 98 YALE L.J. 341, 356
(1988) ("[M]ere information provision may not be sufficient" because it depends on "the
limited information-processing capacities of people").
91National Assessment ofAdult Literacy, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS
http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kfdemographics.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
92 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 712 (citing Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General
Performance on a Numeracy Scale Among Highly Educated Samples, 21 MEDICAL
DECISION MAKING 37, 40 (2001)).
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sanguine in our predictions of our own behavior.93 Unfounded
optimism about ourselves can lead to unwarranted risk-taking.94 For
example, consumers routinely downplay the likelihood that they will
carry a balance on their credit cards, leading them to assume, wrongly,
that a higher interest rate won't affect them.95 Consumers make
similar errors in assessing their cell phone usage, leading them to
generally overpay for those contracts.96 These prediction errors play
an even more important role in the Network Neutrality context
because, unlike credit card rates and cell phone contracts, consumers
must also make predictions about how other consumers will behave
and how their individual conduct fits into the larger collective action
picture described in Part III.D.
All of this may seem daunting, but doable-if assessing the
Network Neutrality policies of a particular broadband provider were
all you had to do today. In reality, our days are filled with the need to
make these kinds of assessments, from the FDA warning on our
morning vitamins (not proven to treat any condition!) to the nutrition
facts on our midnight snacks. To cope (and get through the day having
accomplished something other than reading fine print), consumers
adopt simplifying strategies that exacerbate the challenges we already
face in information gathering and decision-making.97 Faced with too
much information, people actually make worse decisions than they
would have without any disclosure at all.98
After hearing this litany of problems, many readers may ask,
"What's the harm?" Disclosure may be sub-optimal, but surely it
benefits some consumer, somewhere. When asked, consumers
routinely tell pollsters they would like to have more information.
Regulators can easily imagine a situation where one more fact could
have made the difference. In reality, mandated disclosure consumes
government, corporate, and individual resources. If disclosure is not
93 Oren Bar-Gill & Franco Ferrari, Informing Consumers About Themselves, 3 ERASMUS L.
REV. 93, 117-18 (2010).
94 RICHARD C. THALER & CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 31-33 (2008).
95 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375-76 (2004).
96 Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 51 (2006).
97 See generally Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417(2003).
98 Id. at 419.
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achieving regulatory goals, those resources could be better spent
elsewhere. The next Part suggests a program that makes the effort
invested in mandated disclosure worthwhile.
V. TARGETED DISCLOSURES: MORE AND LESS INFORMATION
The transparency requirements laid out in the Open Internet
Order will be developed over the course of the Commission's
development and enforcement of rules interpreting the Order.99
Careful design of those rules (or others created by future Network
Neutrality regimes) can help overcome the challenges laid out in Part
III in order to achieve the benefits of disclosure. In this Part, I suggest
that the Commission can best generate those benefits by creating two
different, concurrent disclosure mechanisms: thorough "full
disclosures" that provide sufficient information to create realizable
performance benefits, and simple yet specific "advisory disclosures"
for ordinary consumers that promote competition and participation.
Cass Sunstein, in his role as the Administrator of the White House
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, has outlined principles
for heads of executive departments and agencies to help them decide
between and execute summary and full disclosures as they work to
implement President Obama's commitments to fostering
transparency, participation, and collaboration throughout the
executive branch.100 Implicit in his guidance are two distinct
audiences: interested lay people who may have limited time,
rationality, and interest in the subject at hand, and individuals and
organizations willing to devote more of their efforts to consuming,
analyzing, and distributing a large quantity of information.
At present, the Open Internet Order's transparency rules stand to
aggravate the difficulties the Commission faces in achieving
mandatory disclosure's benefits because the Commission designed its
transparency regime for a unitary audience-providing too much
information to regular people and not enough information for expert
users. The goals outlined in Part II are best achieved by designing
99 See Open Internet Order, supra note 18, at 17940-41 (reserving the right to change
disclosure rules in the future).
100 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Department and Agencies: Disclosure and
Simplification as Regulatory Tools (June 18, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/inforeg/disclosure-principles.
pdf.
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disclosures that respond separately to those two groups' unique needs
and capacities.
This Article, therefore, proposes two models for disclosure of
Network Neutrality information that meet the needs of each of those
audiences-one to improve performance and one to bolster the
democracy and competition rationales-while retaining disclosure
regulation's practical advantages. Though each type of disclosure may
target a different group of participants, both sets of information
would, of course, be made available to all comers, making the system
more adaptable to heterogeneous preferences. While creating two
different disclosures may create additional costs, those expenditures
are likely to be minimal, particularly as compared to more invasive
regulation.oI
A. FULLER FULL DISCLOSURE
Realizing the full performance benefits mandated Network
Neutrality disclosure could yield will require a lot of information-
more than ordinary consumers can be expected to process. Experts,
on the other hand, deal with large quantities of information differently
than non-experts, who lack the experience and context needed to
develop useful shortcuts.102 More extensive disclosures can overcome
the problems faced by governments and companies and improve their
productivity.
Full disclosures should be created to take advantage of those
expert abilities, better enabling government, industry, and consumer
advocates to develop the full picture of network management needed
to monitor and optimize Network Neutrality regulation. While
companies would expend fewer resources organizing and distributing
information about their Network Neutrality practices, they would be
asked to provide a lot more of it.
The Order has outlined categories of information that companies
should supply: network management practices, performance
characteristics, and terms and conditions of their broadband services.
These are mostly issues of corporate policy. Under those instructions,
the resulting disclosure will likely focus on what a company can do,
102 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 725.
101 This paper takes no position as to who should be responsible for those costs, as between
public and private parties.
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and not what it has actually done.1o3 Providing the listed information
does not create a safe harbor, and the Commission could decide that
full disclosures must also address why, how, and when network
management practices have been used.
Full disclosure, produced in tandem with advisory disclosures
targeted at consumers, shifts the balance of responsibilities between
broadband providers and the Federal Communications Commission
in order to minimize the risks explored in Part III. Full disclosure
requirements blunt the potential anti-consumer effects of allowing
broadband providers to interpret a vague mandate for themselves.
Instead of making Internet access service providers responsible for
deciding (within certain parameters) what and how to disclose, a point
in the disclosure process where the interests of broadband companies
and their consumers diverge, the Commission would receive and cull
the available information and decide how best to transmit it to
consumers, as discussed in the next Part.
Mandating comprehensive disclosures will also alleviate problems
created by uncertainty at the Commission. While technological,
regulatory, and normative uncertainty can cause disclosure mandates
to expand beyond a scope individual consumers can process, the
Commission is equipped to use that large volume of information to
study what information is actually useful in the decision making
process. Instead of possibly erring on the side of overwhelming
consumers with too much information, mandating an extremely
thorough disclosure will allow the Commission to gather information
first, and allow the data to inform what it passes on to consumers, as
discussed in the next section.
B. FROM DISCLOSURE TO ADVICE
The level of detail needed to attain the performance benefits
mandated disclosure can create would overwhelm the vast majority of
consumers. Though there may be an argument that consumers "need"
all that information, a better question might be to ask what they
want.10 4 Consumers make good decisions with limited information
every day. To find a new dentist, you could consult regional studies on
103 Furthermore, the Commission has policies in place that protect confidential
information, such as trade secrets, from public disclosure even as the information is being
disclosed to the Commission. See, e.g., FED. COMMC'N COMM'N, Fact Sheet: FCC's Ex Parte
Rules, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/ex-parte-rules-2011 (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
104 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 73, at 746.
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error rates and the need for repeat procedures, but you are more likely
to ask around for a recommendation.105 The democracy and
competition rationales require disclosures that reach consumers in a
meaningful way; they must be obviously useful, easy to locate and
understand, and aligned with a consumer's reasonable assessment of
her own needs and the broader implications for society. In order for
government to provide or facilitate such a clear statement, it will need
to carefully select a limited information set, establish clear standards
for acceptable disclosures, and take a stance on uncertain political and
(at least temporarily) technological questions.
The Commission can meet these challenges by serving as an
information intermediary for consumers, adding to summary
disclosure the next step of analysis: advice. Recognizing the
heterogeneous preferences among its broad audience, such a system
should help consumers assess their own use and interests quickly and
without technical knowledge. This could be accomplished via a short
series of questions (for example, "how many videos do you watch
online most days?" but not "how much data do you transfer most
days?") that could build a profile of use. These profile questions could
also help consumers estimate what their needs are likely to be in the
future-an important feature because "switching" costs are high and
consumers rarely change providers outside the context of a change in
residence.10 6 Whatever system is used to build this profile, it should
include a default based on the most common broadband use patterns
so that consumers who wish to further simplify the process can skip
this step.
Next, a system of advice must address the normative judgments
about Network Neutrality inherent in the broadband subscription
decision. Fairly predicting the implications of different practices
admittedly presents a challenge for this divided Commission, which
has had difficulty articulating a clear set of beliefs. The Order adopted
by the Commission has begun this work by identifying the competing
interests at stake. An advice system could address collective action
concerns by giving consumers the Commission's assessment of the
Internet-wide outcomes of everyone choosing a particular feature,
105 See id.
106 FEDERAL COMMC'N COMM'N, BROADBAND DECISIONS: WHAT DRIVES CONSUMERS TO
SWITCH-OR STICK WITH-THEIR BROADBAND INTERNET PROVIDER (2010) (FCC WORKING
PAPER), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/DailyBusiness/2o1o/dbl2o6/DOC-
303264A1.pdf.
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while still acknowledging that those predictions are based on the
kinds of normative conclusions agencies are asked to make every day
and are necessarily speculative.o7 For example, consumers who
indicate that they believe that the most important feature of the
Internet is the ability to deliver consistently high speeds at all times
might be fairly directed to information about the most aggressive
congestion management programs.
Finally, having gathered information about the consumers' usage
and preferences, this summary disclosure system can offer advice
about what kinds of service fit the consumer best (perhaps with links
to providers matching those characteristics).os That advice should
make clear what a particular set of network management actions
means to the average user. For example, if you choose a provider that
throttles traffic during peak periods to the top five percent of data
users, you might not be able to use certain features of your phone at
busy parts of the day.
This aggregation of simple information and advice would not pick
winners and losers (and should be careful to not give the impression
that it does). The Commission will have, in the course of the full
disclosure outlined above, collected detailed information on
congestion management, application-specific behavior, device
attachment rules, and security practices from all broadband providers.
Broadband companies would not provide a particular mix of those
characteristics without believing it to be ideal for some consumer
profile, and the system should be designed to assess a large variety of
preferences, without over-burdening all consumers with information
unlikely to be relevant to their circumstances. If, however, evidence
from this evaluation system leads some broadband providers to shape
107 These kinds of normative conclusions are already built into the disclosures companies
are using-they are just worded in ways that favor the company's current practices. For
example, "Verizon Wireless strives to provide customers the best experience when using
our network, a shared resource among tens of millions of customers. To help achieve this,
if you use an extraordinary amount of data and fall within the top 5% of Verizon Wireless
data users we may reduce your data throughput speeds periodically for the remainder of
your then current and immediately following billing cycle to ensure high quality network
performance for other users at locations and times of peak demand. Our proactive
management of the Verizon Wireless network is designed to ensure that the remaining 95%
of data customers aren't negatively affected by the inordinate data consumption of just a
few users." Customer Agreement, supra note 1.
o8 All information collections by government agencies raise privacy concerns. While how
the FCC might handle that issue in implementing an advice model is outside the scope of
this article, it is worth noting that none of the aims discussed in this Part require the
Commission to personally identify or keep the data that consumers provide.
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their offerings to match the preferences of a large cohort of
consumers, that feedback loop is likely to benefit consumers.
Full disclosure provides other checks against potential overreach
or market interference by the FCC. The comprehensive disclosures
provided to the Commission, while not directed at consumers, would
be made available to the public (subject to trade secret limitations) so
that companies, academics, and public interest organizations can
publish their own recommendations. Competing sources of advice can
give consumers options, making explicit areas where the Commission
has made a normative choice and offer another opinion. They may
also serve as a laboratory for different methodologies and modes of
presentation that ultimately influences the advice the FCC provides.
But these third-party opinions are not, by themselves, a sufficient
solution. The collective action problem described in Part II.C faces
interest groups as well as individual consumers. The FCC can advocate
for the national public interest inside the realm of democratic
legitimately in ways not available to private actors. That democratic
undergirding is especially important because of the close link between
access to the Internet and civic engagement, as well and to freedoms
of speech and association.
Even with a well-designed system for providing advice, challenges
remain. The Commission may need to take steps to ensure consumers
are aware that Network Neutrality issues are a part of the broadband
purchase decision-and that the other prongs of the Open Internet
Order, such as the ban on blocking, do not obviate the need for
consumers to decide among alternatives. But the system does not have
to be perfect to be an effective use of agency resources and consumers'
time.109 Sophisticated Internet users may find more direct and precise
ways (including technologies that can detect network management) of
monitoring their provider's behavior. But for most users, advisory
disclosures can be a low-cost aid to deciding between competing
services.
1o Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology ofSubprime Mortgage Contracts,
94 CORNELL L. REv. 1073, 1150 (2009) ("It is worth reminding ourselves that even an
optimally designed APR will not be perfect. It is impossible to fully capture the
multidimensionality of a mortgage loan in a one-dimensional metric. This inevitable
limitation, however, does not detract from the social value of the APR disclosure.
Sophisticated borrowers who can deal with the complexity and multidimensionality will
not rely solely on the APR. Those who rely solely, or mainly, on the APR will be the less
sophisticated borrowers who, absent the APR disclosure, would rely on an even less
accurate proxy.").
208 [Vol. 8:1
BONNER
VI. CONCLUSION
Mandated disclosure is an attractive regulatory option. Done right,
it enhances competition, increases participation, and improves
performance-all while being comparatively easy to implement. But
things can easily go wrong. For mandated disclosure to succeed,
regulators, regulated companies, and consumers must all act carefully
and conscientiously even when they cannot or do not want to.
Information alone is not enough. This Article has laid out some of the
challenges that need to be addressed in order to achieve the full
benefits of disclosure as a Network Neutrality regulation and has
suggested a transparency program to meet those goals. There are, no
doubt, other systems that could overcome the many ways mandated
disclosure could fail. But without addressing the challenges described
in this Article, disclosure is at best a waste of time and at worst
harmful to the overall project. The success of Network Neutrality
regulation depends on a carefully designed and implemented mandate
that simultaneously provides both more and less information.
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